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FALLING OUT OF LOVE WITH AMERICA:
THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE
MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION
FRANK 0. BowMAN, III*
INTRODUCTION
Watergate made me a lawyer. On August 8, 1974, Richard Nixon
resigned the office of President of the United States.1 Three weeks
later, I returned to college to begin my junior year. I was a pre-med
biochemistry major scheduled to spend most of the fall semester sur-
rounded by beakers, spectrophotometers, test tube racks, glass slides,
and fumes of formaldehyde and acetone. During the summer, as the
evidence against the President mounted and impeachment moved
from the realm of the fantastic to virtual certainty, the prospect of a
life among the petri dishes grew less and less alluring. I will confess
that some of this disenchantment undoubtedly arose from a persistent
inability, demonstrated in two passes through organic chemistry, to
grasp the molecular configurations made possible by the hexagonal
geometry of the carbon atom. Nonetheless, the most powerful source
of my disquiet was the realization, growing for a year and more as I
watched the televised hearings before Senator Sam Ervin's Watergate
Committee, and then the proceedings of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee as it agonized toward a vote on articles of impeachment, that I
was far more interested in what these men and women were doing
than in all the cytosis, osmosis, and symbiosis of all the microorga-
nisms ever spawned.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. B.A.,
The Colorado College; J.D., Harvard Law School. This Article is dedicated to David Con-
ner, gentleman, tireless warrior, and matchless advocate, who has honored me with his
friendship for nearly twenty years. I am grateful for the comments of Andy Klein and Dr.
Frank 0. Bowman, Jr., on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. President Nixon announced his resignation in a speech delivered August 8, 1974.
The resignation became effective at noon the following day. See THEODORE H. WHITE,
BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 442-46 (1986) (text of the resignation
speech of President Richard M. Nixon).
2. These things are, of course, all a matter of perspective. Professor Ernest Young, in
a testament to the aptness of his surname, recently wrote that his "only distinct memory of
Watergate [was] being upset that the Flintstones cartoon program was canceled for an
entire summer so that the networks could show those awful hearings on TV." Ernest A.
Young, The Virtues of Presidential Weakness: A Comment on Fitts, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 741, 741
(1999).
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It was not merely the theater of Watergate that drew me in,
though the drama of the thing was undeniable. After all, one can be
mesmerized by the grisly spectacle of a train wreck without feeling any
urge to become an engineer. What captivated me was the people of
Watergate, principally the legislators on the Senate and House com-
mittees, but also members of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Of-
fice, and even members of the Nixon administration itself-elected or
appointed officials, partisan politicians mostly, and certainly no
saints-who, on balance, acted with firmness, integrity, and restraint.
As a Democrat and no special fan of Richard Nixon,3 my particular
heroes were the obvious ones: Archibald Cox, Sam Ervin, Peter
Rodino, Barbara Jordan. But I think even then I admired them as
much for their caution and their obvious and unfeigned sense of the
gravity of the task they had undertaken as for their investigative prow-
ess, their rhetoric, their wit, or their ultimate success in forcing a
flawed and corrupt president from office. And even back then, de-
spite my instinctive rooting interest in the Democrats, I came away
from Watergate with a deep respect for those Republicans in and out
of Congress who-despite the personal and political cost-insisted on
finding the truth, refused to blink at what they found, and finally,
sadly, repudiated their own leader.4
I wanted to be like these people, wanted a part, however small, in
the high drama of American public life. The immediately obvious
point was that nearly all of the players in Watergate (both the heroes
and the villains) were lawyers. And so, in the fall of 1974, I aban-
doned the study of the natural world, took up the study of history and
politics, and resolved to go to law school. Twenty-five years later, after
law school, two decades of practice as a trial lawyer, and at the begin-
ning of a second career as a legal academic, to my immense surprise, I
found myself playing a (very) small part in the second presidential
impeachment of my lifetime as the co-author of the official statement
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to the House
Judiciary Committee on the meaning of "high Crimes and Misde-
3. Although, in a spirit of candor and full disclosure, I remember quite distinctly that,
had I been nine months older and legally able to do so, I probably would have voted for
Nixon over George McGovern in 1972.
4. My enduring admiration for Barry Goldwater, a man for whom, like many young
Democrats of the time, I had very little use, began with his unflinching leadership of the
congressional delegation that went to Richard Nixon to convince him to resign in the wake
of the disclosure of tapes proving his efforts to obstruct justice. See WHITE, supra note 1, at
34 (discussing Goldwater's decision to tell President Nixon that he must resign).
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meanors."' Of course, we know how that came out. President Clinton
was impeached by the House of Representatives and acquitted by the
Senate.6 By the time this Article reaches print, he will have completed
his term. Irremediably stained, but defiant. Disgraced and dimin-
ished, but persistently, almost perversely popular.
The fall of Richard Nixon was tragedy in the classic sense. A com-
manding personality clawed to the heights of power and was then
brought low when crippling flaws in his character led him into con-
duct that was a serious affront to democratic government. The Clin-
ton impeachment was vulgar farce.7 A surpassingly agile politician
with an adolescent sex drive and an urge for self-preservation that far
outstripped any sense of personal honor was attacked by opponents
who missed their quarry and destroyed or diminished themselves by
trying to elevate a squalid extramarital sexual encounter into an affair
of state. For me at least, the effect of watching Nixon's descent was all
that the ancient Greek commentators on the drama could have
wished for in the spectator of a tragedy: pity, terror, catharsis, enlight-
enment, an aspiration to nobler things. By contrast, the dominant
emotion inspired by Bill Clinton's escape from early retirement was
5. See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of
the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 105th Cong. 342 (1998) [hereinafter Hearing on the Back-
ground and History of Impeachment] (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, Professor, and Ste-
phen L. Sepinuck, Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law). This paper, substantially
expanded and revised in light of the outcome of the Clinton impeachment proceedings,
was later published as a law review article. Frank 0. Bowman, III & Stephen L. Sepinuck,
"High Crimes & Misdemeanors" Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment,
72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1517 (1999).
6. 144 CONG. REC. H12,040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (House vote on Articles of
Impeachment); 145 CONG. REc. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (Senate vote of acquittal
on Articles of Impeachment).
7. Judge Posner has a far higher opinion of the dramaturgy of the Clinton-Lewinsky
entanglement, calling it:
high drama-Wagnerian in intensity and protraction, with wonderful actors, the
Clintons, in the lead roles, a supporting cast of hundreds, dramatic revelations
aplenty (the tapes, the dress, the sex lives of Republican Congressmen), a
splendid libretto by Kenneth Starr, a Greek chorus of television commentators;
plus hapless walk-ons, clandestine comings and goings, betrayals, suspense, rever-
sals of fortune, hints of violence (supplied by the Clinton haters), a May-Decem-
ber romance as it might be depicted by an Updike or a Cheever, a doubling and
redoubling of plot, a Bildungsroman, even allegorical commentary (the movies Pri-
mary Colors and Wag the Dog) and a touch of comic opera (Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's costume out of Iolanthe).
RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF
PRESIDENT CLINTON 262 (1999) (footnotes omitted). I'd be lying if I didn't admit that
some parts of the ghastly business were fun to watch. And it did drag on longer than the
Ring Cycle. But the Clinton-Lewinsky mess more closely resembled the 1950s Alan Drury
political novel Advise and Consent-as reimagined by Jerry Springer and narrated by Ger-
aldo Rivera-than anything by Wagner. (And I don't even know what a Bildungsroman is.)
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the urge to bathe with strong disinfectant soap-and then to retreat
into the countryside to take up beekeeping, or some other occupation
as removed as possible from the contemplation of American law and
politics.
This radical contrast in my reactions to the impeachment contro-
versies that stand at either end of my life in the law so far has led me
to ask three questions. First, were the Nixon and Clinton affairs truly
as different as my memory makes them? Were the villains of Water-
gate as villainous and the heroes as heroic as I remember them? Were
nearly all the players on both sides of l'affaire Lewinsky as shallow and
fatuous as they seemed? Or to put the question in broader historical
context, was the impeachment of Bill Clinton truly distinct, not only
from Watergate, but from all of the other (fortunately few) occasions
on which a president was seriously threatened with removal from of-
fice? Second, if the Clinton impeachment really was as bizarre, un-
precedented, and unsettling an event as it seemed, how could such a
thing have happened? Finally, what are the implications for the fu-
ture of the presidency, and more generally, for the project of govern-
ance in America, of the incredible but incontrovertible fact that a
president of the United States was impeached and nearly stripped of
his office for lying about sexual infidelity?
I. WAS THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT REALLY ALL THAT DIFFERENT?
I originally intended to devote a hefty chunk of space to a meticu-
lous comparison of the Clinton impeachment with the cases of An-
drew Johnson and Richard Nixon, as well as with the near-
impeachment experience of Ronald Reagan in the Iran-Contra affair,
all in aid of demonstrating, with furrowed brow, pursed lips, and in a
tone of high scholarly seriousness, that the Clinton case really was dif-
ferent. After a very few hours work on this project, I abandoned it as
just too silly.
If the question is whether the subject matters of these four consti-
tutional crises were notably dissimilar, a simple word association exer-
cise provides answer enough: Andrew Johnson: Civil War,
Reconstruction, reintegration of the defeated South into the Union,
Tenure of Office Act, presidential appointment authority, congres-
sional versus presidential power;' Richard Nixon: Vietnam War, bur-
glary, illegal wiretaps of political opponents, IRS audits of enemies,
8. See generally DAVID MILLER DEWITr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHN-
SON (special ed. 1992) (discussing the events leading to the impeachment and acquittal of
President Johnson).
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directing CIA to halt the FBI Watergate investigation, bribes to silence
witnesses, secret bombing of Cambodia;9 Ronald Reagan: war in Nicara-
gua, hostages in Iran, the Boland Amendment, presidential accounta-
bility to Congress for covert operations;10 William Jefferson Clinton:
Monica Lewinsky, PaulaJones, civil deposition, thong, cigar, fellatio.11
For the past two years, a small army of commentators (including my-
self)"1 has ploughed this furrow with every implement in the scholarly
toolshed.'3 All this industry was understandable, indeed inevitable, so
long as there was a real prospect that President Clinton might be re-
moved. One necessary strand of the recent impeachment debate was
the common law exercise of winnowing sparse precedents for evi-
dence about the historical understanding of the vexing phrase "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 4 Now that the crisis has ended and we
stand at the edge of the field in the cool of the evening, looking back
on our labor, it is plain that millions of carefully chosen words were
expended, painstakingly proving the obvious: Bill Clinton's offenses,
poorly as they reflect on him as a human being, were substantively
trivial and constitutionally insignificant.
If, on the other hand, the question is whether the primary deci-
sion-makers in pre-Clinton impeachment crises had notably different
attitudes toward the presidency and the country, better understood
the gravity of their task, and were wiser in the exercise of their respon-
sibilities than the players in President Clinton's imbroglio, the answer
is less certain and rests more in the eye of the beholder. To me, at
least, the conclusion is still plain enough. Although endless compari-
9. See generally WHITE, supra note 1 (detailing the unfolding of the Watergate scandal
and President Nixon's resignation).
10. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CoNTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 1-24 (1994) (docu-
menting the events surrounding the Iran-Contra scandal).
11. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 16-58 (discussing President Clinton's conduct leading
up to his impeachment).
12. See Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 5.
13. Among the many post-mortems on the Clinton impeachment, two of the best are
Richard Posner's book, An Affair of State, supra note 7, and Robert W. Gordon's article,
Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FoiRDtm L. Rv.
639 (1999).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see, e.g., Hearing on the Background and History of Impeachment,
supra note 5, at 342 (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, Professor, and Stephen L.
Sepinuck, Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law) (seeking "to assist Members of
Congress by discussing the meaning of the constitutional phrase 'treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors,' with particular emphasis on five interpretive questions
implicit in the nature of the specifications by the Independent Counsel"); Bowman &
Sepinuck, supra note 5, at 1520 (discussing the issue of defining impeachable offenses by
"reviewing history ... , text, and scholarship to discern the meaning of the constitutional
phrase 'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'" (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 4)).
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sons are possible, the essential difference between the protagonists of
Clinton-Lewinsky and those of, say, Watergate, is captured in a single
pairing. In Watergate, Peter Rodino, a NewJersey congressman of no
particular prior distinction, cautiously but firmly steered the House
Judiciary Committee to a bipartisan consensus on procedure, and fi-
nally, after long and careful debate, to a strongly bipartisan vote on
articles of impeachment against Richard Nixon.' 5 When it was over,
and when the vote to impeach was at last taken, Rodino returned to
his office, gazed out his window, and cried at the enormity of what he
and his colleagues had done.16 Rodino's Clinton-era successor, Henry
Hyde, early abandoned the idea of procedural consensus, pushed arti-
cles of impeachment through the Judiciary Committee on a straight
party-line vote," and then, chanting "Rule of Law, Rule of Law," as a
protective mantra,'8 sought vainly to distinguish President Clinton's
adulteries from his own 9 (and those of a startling number of the Re-
publican leadership),2° and President Clinton's lies from the Iran-
Contra perjuries of the Reagan administration (which Hyde had
defended) .21
15. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 354-60, 380-406 (discussing the appointment of Peter
Rodino and his strategy in navigating the House Judiciary Committee through the Nixon
impeachment debate).
16. See id. at 407.
17. See Impeachment of WilliamJefferson Clinton, President of the United States, H.R. REP. No.
105-830, at 128-36 (1998) (setting forth the votes of the House Committee on the judiciary
on articles of impeachment with votes being cast along strict party lines, 21 to 16 in favor of
the first and third articles, and 20 to 17 in favor of the second article).
18. See Press Release, Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Trial of William J. Clinton: Closing Remarks
of Congressman HenryJ. Hyde (Jan. 16, 1999) (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.)
(stating that "[t~he rule of law is what stands between all of us and the arbitrary exercise of
power by the state").
19. Hyde attempted to differentiate his adulterous affair from that of the President by
stating that "'[t]he statute of limitations has long since passed on my youthful indiscre-
tions.'" Howard Kurtz, Report of Hyde Affair Stirs Anger; Judiciary Chairman Admits '60s Rela-
tionship but Calls Story 'Attempt to Intimidate Me,'WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1998, at A15.
20. See Lloyd Grove, Under Fire in a Glass House; Congressional Stone-Throwers Face an On-
slaught of Dirt-Digging, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1998, at CI (stating that during the course of
the Lewinsky scandal, the extramarital affairs of Reps. Dan Burton, Helen Chenoweth, and
Henry Hyde were exposed). Republican Majority Whip Tom DeLay indignantly con-
demned the exposure of these Republican affairs as an attempt by Democrats in the White
House "to destroy their enemies." David Stout, Testing of a President: Mudslinging; Leaders in
House Act to Discourage the Spread of Embarrassing Stones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at A23.
21. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 680-81 (comparing Hyde's "stentorian" denounce-
ment of perjury in the Clinton matter with his vocal support of Oliver North and John
Poindexter, both of whom were charged with committing perjury in the Iran-Contra mat-
ter); The Impeachment Hearings; Never Condoned Lying Under Oath, Hyde Says, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
9, 1998, at A20 (stating that "[iun 1987, when Reagan's aides were accused of lying to
Congress, Hyde defended them and faulted those who 'label every truth and every decep-
tion an outrage'").
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I do not wish to overstate this second point by drawing too great a
distinction between, for example, the mass of public men and women
of the Watergate generation and the mass of politicians of today. The
political classes of every age and every country are generously popu-
lated with shallow opportunists, eager to exploit scandal for partisan
gain, and with sheep easily convinced that acquiescence in whatever
the leadership of their party or faction may command is synonymous
with statesmanship. There can be no doubt that there were radical
Republicans who sought the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, and
modern Democrats who strove for the ouster of Richard Nixon and
Ronald Reagan, for no better reason than that these presidents were
leaders of the opposition party, whose downfall would represent a
short-term political coup. Likewise, in every case in which a presi-
dency has been in jeopardy, those who defended the president,
whether successfully or not, were often motivated by their own narrow
partisanship or other less-than-highminded considerations. And in
every age, it is easy for even decent and well-meaning people to con-
vince themselves that what harms their political opponents and
pleases their most fervent supporters is also in the best interest of the
country. Nonetheless, one glaring distinction between the Clinton
case and all those that came before it was the presence in every prior
case and the virtual absence in l'affaire Lewinsky of grown-ups in the
leadership group-persons of a serious cast of mind who restrained
the venom of their own zealots, led the sheep in their flocks, reached
out to engage the views of the opposition, and most importantly,
thought long and hard about the implications of their conduct for the
future of the Republic. 22
The final point of difference between the Clinton impeachment
and its historical antecedents is that Clinton's troubles arose from the
confluence of a presidential disposition to lust and mendacity-
neither of which had been unheard of among America's chief execu-
tives-and the post-Watergate criminalization of politics, a phenome-
non that really was without precedent in this country.23  The
22. See Fred H. AItshuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 745, 746 (2000) (exploring the view that the Clinton impeachment was "more political
and less responsible than the Nixon impeachment hearings of 1974").
23. Many other observers have commented on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Edwin M.
Yoder, The Presidency and the Criminalization of Politics, 43 ST. Louis U. LJ. 749 (1999) (dis-
cussing post-Watergate "reforms" that have led to the criminalization of normal political
behavior); John M. Griesbach, Three Levels of Trouble: A Comment on Edwin Yoder's "The Presi-
dency and the Criminalization of Politics, "43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761 (1999) (analyzing the post-
Watergate legal structure that has been developed to regulate the ethics of federal public
officials).
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conditions necessary for the emergence of this phenomenon aggre-
gated slowly, and its many components, often beneficial in themselves,
fell together largely by accident. The twentieth century saw an explo-
sive growth in the reach of federal criminal law, for reasons wholly
unrelated to concern about wrongdoing among the governing classes
of the federal government.24 Included in the federal criminal code,
quite properly, are prohibitions against perjury and false statements25
that are seldom used, but always available. 26 On the civil side, Con-
gress passed an ever-more-comprehensive set of laws that makes virtu-
ally every sort of unpleasant, unethical, or merely boorish behavior a
legal cause of action. 27 The courts and Congress also approved rules
of civil discovery that allow intrusive questioning into the most collat-
eral of matters.
28
In addition to these general developments, the post-Watergate
impetus for reform of politics produced a variety of ethics-in-govern-
ment laws. Notable among these were codes of behavior regarding
campaign finance and conflicts of interest for elected and appointed
officials, the violation of which carried both civil and criminal penal-
ties.29 Watergate also gave us an independent counsel statute ° that
conferred on unelected officials belonging to none of the three con-
stitutional branches of government the power to pursue our highest
public officers for any real or suspected transgression of the sprawling
federal criminal code. 31 Most critically in the Clinton case, the inde-
pendent counsel statute devolved substantial responsibility for investi-
24. For a brief discussion of the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction, see Frank
0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging and the State of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 312-14 (2000).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
26. For a discussion of the application of federal perjury law in the Clinton case, see
Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 5, at 1554-58.
27. See, for example, the discussion of hostile work environment sexual harassment
claims in Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 674-76 (E.D. Ark. 1998). In the public sphere,
examples include regulation of lobbying, financial disclosure, receipt of gifts, honoraria,
outside earned income, and outside and post-employment activities. See Griesbach, supra
note 24 (discussing these laws and the role they play in overseeing the "ethics" of federal
public officials).
28. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (allowing discovery of any information relevant to
the subject matter of a civil action, even if the subject matter is not related to a claim or
defense, provided that the information sought is not privileged).
29. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (1994)).
30. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)).
31. See id.; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the inherent problems with creating an independent counsel that is not a part of
the executive branch).
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gating impeachable offenses from Congress, where political
calculations can restrain as well as breed excess, to professional crime-
fighters3 2 to whom political calculations, even those of moderation,
are anathema and presumptively corrupt.
Moreover, in this century, government has become an indispen-
sable participant in so many arenas of economic and social life in a
country that is increasingly, almost indecently, wealthy, while becom-
ing increasingly heterogeneous in ethnicity, religion, economic inter-
ests, and social mores. The omnipresence of government in a
wealthy, heterogenous society has spawned well-funded advocacy
groups at both extremes of the political spectrum that seek to influ-
ence government, but which are beyond direct political control. Such
groups-right-wing examples of which figured prominently in the
Clinton matter 3 3-have demonstrated a propensity to use any availa-
ble legal or public relations tool to demonize and destroy those they
perceive to be their enemies.3 4
The confluence of all these developments created a new possibil-
ity in American political life-the routine use of the civil and criminal
law to disable one's political opponents. The method was refined in
the years preceding Clinton's encounter with it. Find a mistake or
personal weakness. If it is already criminal, call for an independent
counsel or a Justice Department investigation. If not criminal yet, file
a civil lawsuit or start a congressional investigation. If no direct evi-
dence of criminality is unearthed, get the target under oath. Force
the victim to admit indiscretions that will embarrass and bring politi-
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994) (enumerating the duties and powers of the indepen-
dent counsel).
33. One such organization,Judicial Watch, has been suing the Clintons and the federal
government throughout the Clinton presidency. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton,
880 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995) (adjudicating Judicial Watch's challenge to the legality of a
legal defense fund created by President and Mrs. Clinton); Harvey Berkman, Even If Starr
Disappeared, There'd Be Klayman, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1999, at A9 (describing the activities of
Judicial Watch and its founder, Larry Klayman). The role of Richard Mellon Scaife, a
millionaire publisher and ardent Clinton opponent, was also often discussed during the
Whitewater and Lewinsky scandals. See In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1144, 1153 (E.D. Ark. 1997)
(describing Scaife as a person who, "according to various media reports, has used his for-
tune to press a media campaign discrediting President Clinton and suggesting that Vincent
Foster, Jr., may have been murdered"). The conservative Southeastern Legal Foundation,
another example, funded the PaulaJones lawsuit against President Clinton. John Delano,
Push to Disbar Clinton Would Find Dead-End in PA, 11 [AwvEls J. 6 (2000).
34. See supra note 33. Republicans would doubtless point to the role of liberal advocacy
groups in the confirmation proceedings of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. See generally
NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK AND THE
POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS (1998) (analyzing the Bork hearings and subse-
quent confirmation proceedings and discussing the role of special interest groups in the
confirmation process).
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cal ruin, or to lie and commit perjury. The Clinton affair was the
logical endpoint of an increasingly ugly trend: the constitutional
mechanism of impeachment pressed into service as the ultimate
weapon in the arsenal of practitioners of the politics of personal
destruction.
In the end, the Clinton impeachment was unique because of the
combination of three factors: the squalid triviality of the underlying
conduct, the absence of mature leadership from the elected and ap-
pointed guardians of the constitutional system, and a new, mean,
criminalized politics. The next question is, how did we come to such a
pass? Even if politics has turned ugly and public officials have become
feckless beyond the historical norm, how did oral sex become the core
of a successful impeachment of an American president?
II. How COULD IT HAVE HAPPENED?
A. The Trap That Post-Watergate Legalism Set for Politics
One might argue on behalf of the congressional leadership that
the fault was not in themselves, but in their stars. That is, one might
reasonably contend that the quota of legislators with the makings of
statesmen was no higher among the Democrats of 1974 than among
the Republicans of 1999."5 What changed, on this view, was the politi-
cal and legal environment in which the Nixon and Clinton scandals
occurred. One explanation for the Clinton mess is that the post-
Watergate reforms have substituted ethical perfectionism enforceable
through criminal penalties-a sort of utopian legalism-for the con-
stitutional scheme of controlling both public corruption and factional
excesses through political interactions between, and factional conflict
within, governmental branches. Not only did the post-Watergate legal
apparatus, composed of expanded substantive criminal law and novel
politically unaccountable institutions like that of the independent
counsel, grind out sometimes quite unreasonable political prosecu-
35. There is some reason to think that Congress has in fact grown more ideologically
polarized in the last twenty-five years. For example, one study of Senate voting records
showed that in 1999, for the first time in the nineteen years for which data was kept, every
Democrat in the Senate had a more liberal voting record than the most liberal Republican,
and conversely, every Republican had a more conservative voting record than every Demo-
crat. Similar results were reported for the House of Representatives. Terry Carter, In the
Beltway: Even Lobby Shops Are Dividing Along Political Lines These Days, 86 A.B.A. J. 25 (Oct.
2000). Of course, strong ideological convictions need not necessarily produce uncivil, de-
structive behavior, but a legislature divided between two parties, each weighted toward its
own ideological extreme, is a tough environment for the gentle art of compromise.
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tions on its own,36 but its existence had indirect effects on the nomi-
nally unrelated traditional constitutional mechanisms. The Clinton
case is a wonderful illustration of both phenomena.
First, the Independent Counsel's office pursued the President's
underlings, and his wife, and ultimately the President himself, in di-
rections and to degrees that a politically responsive Justice Depart-
ment or Congress (controlled by the opposing party though it was)
would very likely never have done.37 (I think it beyond dispute, for
example, that had Linda Tripp taken her story to the House Judiciary
Committee, the very most that might have happened would have been
that she and Monica Lewinsky would have been used to create a tem-
porary political embarrassment for the President. The suggestion that
an impeachment inquiry would have been opened on this basis is ab-
surd.) Second, and more critically to the present point, by sticking
doggedly to a legalistic view of his mandate, exposing every tawdry
detail of the Lewinsky matter, and in the course of doing so, forcing
the President into a grand jury perjury trap, the Independent Counsel
also trapped Republicans in the legislative branch.
The essence of politics-even politics of a very mean kind-is
messy and imprecise moderation. Politicians rarely fight battles to the
last trench. Thus, discovery of every detail of the absolute truth about
a disputed matter is almost never a precondition for political decision.
The arts of compromise and living to fight another day require a toler-
ation for ambiguity and obfuscation. Law, however, has the opposite
disposition. The law trumpets its devotion to Truth, with a capital "T."
Lawyers, particularly good lawyers, and still more particularly good
prosecutors, are experts at the craft of excavating every detail of any
transaction that comes under their scrutiny. The product of the Inde-
pendent Counsel's legal investigation was thus a monument to a cer-
tain aspect of the lawyer's art-a treasure trove of detail, which the
Independent Counsel delivered to Congress with the air of one who
has done something wonderful. And although certain congressmen
may have welcomed it, the effect was akin to your dog strolling into
the family reunion and proudly presenting the fragrant corpse of a
long-dead skunk. Such a thing cannot be ignored. It calls for an im-
36. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 640-41 (providing as examples of unreasonable politi-
cal prosecutions the three-year, $11.9 million investigation of Mike Espy for receiving gifts
totaling $35,000, and the four-year, $10 million investigation of Henry Cisneros for making
false statements to the FBI regarding payments he made to a former mistress).
37. See id. at 641 (discussing how Independent Counsel Starr, after failing to collect
enough evidence to charge the Clintons with wrongdoing in the Whitewater matter,
"leverag[ed] his authority" to conduct an investigation into the PaulaJones sexual harass-
ment matter).
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mediate and regrettably public decision-both about what to do with
the skunk and what to say to the dog. Republicans who, without the
Independent Counsel's report, would have enjoyed (and exploited)
the President's discomfiture over disclosure of his sexual misadven-
tures, but would never have used congressional investigative powers to
pursue the details, were now forced to choose between impeaching
the President or seeming to condone both his personal immorality
and a felony violation of the criminal law. 8 With the world looking
on, they congratulated the dog, and convinced themselves that dead
skunk was filet mignon.
The post-Watergate reformers sought to cure a perceived weak-
ness in the constitutional system of checks and balances in the face of
serious presidential wrongdoing by turning to law to fix politics. They
wrote laws delineating the proper conduct of public men and women,
and created an extra-constitutional inquisitorial office to ensure that
the law was enforced, even if the heavens should fall. 9 What the re-
formers forgot is that politics has virtues as well as vices, and that one
of those virtues is the instinct to moderation. The framers of the Con-
stitution certainly relied on political competition among institutions
and factions to produce conflict in which the self-interest of each insti-
tution or faction would be checked by the strivings of its institutional
or factional opponents.4 ° But the framers also recognized that politics
is often home to public-spirited action, and that even narrow calcula-
tions of political interest will often counsel in favor of restraint and
magnanimity. The trouble with the rule of law is that sometimes "the
law is a ass," knowing neither common sense nor anything else outside
itself. Thus, Clinton's congressional tormentors might justify them-
selves by arguing that post-Watergate utopian legalism left little room
for either political maneuver or broadminded statesmanship.
There is, I think, a good deal of truth in this critique of post-
Watergate reforms. But it only partially explains, and cannot excuse,
the Clinton-Lewinsky fiasco. Ronald Reagan served under the stric-
tures of the Watergate reforms and was subject to scrutiny by an inde-
38. Although the point has been endlessly debated, it seems futile to deny that Presi-
dent Clinton committed perjury on several occasions in the Paula Jones deposition and
during his grand jury testimony. For further discussion of this point, see Bowman &
Sepinuck, supra note 5, at 1560 n.166, 1561 n.168.
39. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)) (creating the Office of Independent
Counsel); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing the independent counsel
statute).
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the uses and dangers of
factions).
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pendent counsel. 41 Reagan could have been impeached over Iran-
Contra, and on more constitutionally substantial grounds than those
marshaled against Clinton, but it did not happen. Independent
Counsel Lawrence Walsh did not become the head cheerleader and
chief witness in the cause of impeachment.4 2 The legislators princi-
pally responsible for the Iran-Contra investigation decided early on
that, whatever else might come, impeachment was not a live option.43
By contrast, Kenneth Starr-from the moment he sought expansion
of his jurisdiction to encompass the Lewinsky affair, to his final oral
exposition of his written report to Congress-chose at virtually every
juncture the most aggressive, confrontational, prosecutorial option
available to him.4 Congressional Republicans, for their part, while
they ultimately may have outfoxed themselves by using the cover of
the independent counsel statute to defer as long as possible direct
responsibility for investigating the Clinton-Lewinsky matter, could un-
doubtedly have dampened Mr. Starr's enthusiasm for impeachment
by signaling privately that an opinionated, adversarial report from the
Independent Counsel would be unwelcome.
In the end, a determinist explanation of the Clinton impeach-
ment will not wash. The post-Watergate reforms certainly set the stage
for the Lewinsky imbroglio, but no law forced Kenneth Starr, congres-
sional Republicans, or, of course, Bill Clinton into the self-defeating
choices they made. The question remains, why did they all do what
they did?
B. The Fading Power of the American Idea
In truth, of course, there is no single explanation for the choices
of the actors in the Clinton impeachment saga. Post-Watergate re-
41. See WALSH, supra note 10, at 445-72 (discussing investigations into the Reagan
White House).
42. Cf id. at xvii (stating that the independent counsel "investigation found no credi-
ble evidence that President Reagan violated any criminal statute").
43. See Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and
Popular Law, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 859, 883-87 (1999) (discussing the consensus among
members of the Senate investigation into the Iran-Contra matter that they had no desire to
'go after" the President or damage the presidency).
44. See id. at 888 (stating that "[t]he Independent Counsel proceeded on his own calcu-
lations and submitted his findings about perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of
justice in the matter of the White House intern to the House for purposes of an impeach-
ment inquiry"); id. at 897 (reporting that "56% of the public believed Starr was mainly
interested in hurting Clinton rather than in finding the truth, [and] 60% thought he was
trying to embarrass Clinton").
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formism, the changed role of the press in modern politics,4 5 the trans-
formation of the two national political parties from "decentralized yet
strong corporate political parties into ... weak associational political par-
ties,"'4 6 and the ongoing "culture wars" in which deep disagreements
about private morality are fought out in public,47 all played a role in
shaping the decisions that led to impeachment. I want to talk here
about one other factor, which I think has been less-discussed. 8
It is often said that the United States is the only nation in history
to be based not on a set of ethnic, territorial, historical, or religious
allegiances, but on an idea. While this claim rings true enough to
have become commonplace, exactly what the idea is is less often ar-
ticulated. The "American Idea" is, of course, a constellation of a num-
ber of ideas. Some of them are the "truths" about the nature of man
and society that the Declaration of Independence held to be self-evi-
dent.49 But what distinguishes the American idea and the American
experience not only from the monarchies and aristocratic oligarchies
of the eighteenth century and the totalitarianisms of the twentieth,
but also from superficially like-minded regimes, such as the succession
of Republics of post-Revolutionary France, which all swore allegiance
to the principles of "Libert6, Egalit6, Fraternit6," is the embodiment
of general principles in a particular set of institutional arrangements.
Thus, the American idea is not merely an abstract embrace of free-
dom, equality, and democratic self-governance, but is instead a socie-
tal compact to promote those ideals within the specific, if historically
evolving, governmental framework outlined in the Constitution.
I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the institutional forms
described in the Constitution would have been conceived by the
founding generation to be indispensable to or inseparable from the
idea of Americanness. When written, the Constitution was a radical
experiment, not a body of scripture. Even the Constitution's principal
45. See Griesbach, supra note 23, at 775-76 (discussing the role of the media in modern
politics).
46. Id. at 773.
47. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 198-216 (identifying the numerous factors that forced
previously private matters into open and regular public discourse in the context of the
Clinton investigations).
48. I will not say "undiscussed." Nothing about the Clinton impeachment has been
undiscussed, and I am profoundly skeptical that, at this late stage, there is anything very
new to say about the business. But I promised the editors of this publication that I'd have a
go, and this is it.
49. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these Truths to
be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness.").
[VOL. 60:5
2001] CLINTON'S IMPEACHMENT AND MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION 19
draftsmen and strongest supporters anticipated that revisions would
be desired and might be reasonably common. ° Moreover, an influ-
ential body of opinion, famously exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, fa-
vored revisiting the question of basic governmental arrangements in
every political generation.5' The identification of the American idea
with the political forms of the Constitution grew instead out of two
centuries of experience in which those forms evolved (sometimes in
directions that would certainly have astonished, and perhaps dis-
mayed, their designers) and proved strong, flexible, and remarkably
suitable to the American people and landscape.
Nonetheless, the Constitution we have and the governing tradi-
tion it engendered both bear the stamp of James Madison far more
than Thomas Jefferson. The United States did not become a land in
perpetual revolutionary ferment. Rather, it settled into two centuries
and more of remarkable institutional stability under the influence of a
fundamental charter that is essentially procedural in character. The
Constitution is, on most substantive questions, outcome neutral.52
With few exceptions, it does not attempt to dictate what the country
shall do, so much as how the decisions will be reached." The peculiar
strength of the American democracy may be said to rest on two pil-
lars-on the one hand, the undoubted practical genius of the consti-
tutional plan itself, and on the other, a passionate, almost religious
faith in the virtues of this most pragmatic of political documents.
What I sensed throughout the Clinton impeachment was that a
distressingly large fraction of the people whose decisions affected the
course of the scandal did not seem to understand the American idea
of government. Or perhaps they understood it, but somehow had
fallen out of love with it. The list of offenders begins with those who
created the independent counsel statute, a law that grew from mis-
trust of the ability of either the executive branch's Justice Department
or the committees of Congress to investigate official corruption and
abuse of power.5 4 The law's drafters not only misread the lessons of
50. This is made apparent in Article V of the Constitution, which details procedures for
amending the Constitution.
51. In 1789, Jefferson wrote to James Madison that "the earth belongs in usufruct to
the living," and that therefore " [e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires
at the end of 19. years." THOMASJEFFERSON, WRITINGS 959, 963 (Library of America 1984).
52. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 90 (1980) (explaining that the focus
of the Constitution is on procedure, not substance, and stating that "[e]ven provisions that
at first glance might seem primarily designed to assure or preclude certain substantive
results seem on reflection to be principally concerned with process").
53. I.
54. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN
AMERICAN POLrrics 41-47 (1992) (discussing the public's declining confidence in govern-
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Watergate-in which both Congress and special prosecutors operat-
ing under the authority of the Justice Department performed very
well, despite presidential resistance-but they failed utterly to recog-
nize the dangers of creating a prosecutorial entity subject to no effec-
tive control by any of the three constitutional branches of
government.55
Next on the list of constitutional sinners was the United States
Supreme Court, the body supposedly most dedicated to the preserva-
tion of constitutional norms. First, the Court upheld the independent
counsel statute against compelling challenges based on the Appoint-
ments Clause of Article II56 and the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. 57 Then, in an action that was a necessary precursor to the
Clinton-Lewinsky-Jones farce, the Court demonstrated an almost un-
believable naivet6 about the nature of high-profile civil litigation, the
demands of the presidential office, and the dynamics of modem, me-
dia-saturated political culture by holding that the district court in the
Paula Jones lawsuit abused its discretion by postponing resolution of
the case until after the President's term of office. 58 The Court ex-
pressed an airy unconcern-almost morbidly comic in retrospect-
about the prospect that a civil lawsuit alleging sexual misconduct by a
sitting president might "conceivably hamper the President in con-
ducting the duties of his office."'59 And during the long battles over
Whitewater and Lewinsky, the Court added insult to injury by denying
certiorari in appeals from D.C. Circuit opinions restricting the scope
ment following Watergate and how public attitudes might have influenced the creators of
the independent counsel law).
55. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the independent counsel statute violates separation-of-power principles because it cre-
ates an office that is not accountable and is given virtually limitless discretion).
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The president] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to ... appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States .... .").
57. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97. Justice Scalia filed a prescient dissent, outlining in
detail the problems and excesses to be anticipated from this constitutional oddity. It. at
697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good
Law? The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1125-35
(1998) (demonstrating how independent counsels have fulfilled the prophecies set forth
in Justice Scalia's dissent).
58. Clinton v.Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707-08 (1997) (holding that the district court's deci-
sion to defer the trial until after the President leaves office was an abuse of discretion
because it failed to take into accountJones's interest in bringing the case to trial); id at
708 (finding that the court failed to "assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of
discovery would be warranted").
59. Id at 708.
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of attorney-client privilege available to government officials 60 and re-
quiring that even a president's bodyguards be made to testify against
him.6" The Court's performance throughout this sequence of deci-
sions and abstentions suggests both a failure to appreciate the basic
tripartite design of American government, and, perhaps, a willingness
to let distaste for the seamy, private behavior of one president affect
decisions that have long-term implications for the health of the office
of the presidency.
Although not a constitutional officer, the Independent Counsel
was particularly guilty of constitutional heedlessness. Although, as
noted, the Office of Independent Counsel was misconceived from the
outset precisely because its occupant was outside the scheme of consti-
tutional restraint, there is nothing in the charter of an independent
counsel that requires him to act without judgment. That Kenneth
Starr so often did behave this way, that he so often charged hither and
thither, sublimely unconcerned about damage to constitutional of-
fices and institutions, is a sin chargeable not to the office he held, but
to the man who inhabited it.
I have already remarked upon the intemperance of congressional
Republicans throughout the Clinton scandals, and will not repeat the
charges against them. What Congress, the Independent Counsel, and
the courts all lost sight of was that fidelity to our Constitution requires
a dedication to protecting the institutions that form the constitutional
structure, to maintaining the sometimes delicate balance between
those institutions, and to giving the inevitably fallible humans who
hold office in those institutions enough space, enough slack, to do the
jobs that the Constitution calls upon them to do.62
60. See Office of the President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 525 U.S. 996 (1998) (deny-
ing certiorari to In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which held that a White
House attorney could not rely on the government attorney-client privilege to withhold
from a grand jury information related to criminal misconduct).
61. Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990 (1998). In denying certiorari for an appeal
from an opinion of the D.C. Circuit, In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the
Court rejected a testimonial privilege for Secret Service officers that would protect "infor-
mation obtained by Secret Service personnel while performing their protective function in
physical proximity to the President," even though it would not apply "in the context of a
federal investigation or prosecution, to bar testimony by an officer or agent concerning
observations or statements that, at the time they were made, were sufficient to provide
reasonable grounds for believing that a felony has been, is being, or will be committed."
Id. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 4, 5 n. 1, In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
62. One must not, of course, omit from this rogues gallery William J. Clinton. He
plainly understood the symbolic power of the presidency, and could play the part to
perfection when it served his ends. The trouble was that he understood the mythic compo-
nents of the presidential office as a "player," in both the Shakespearean and ironic modern
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What accounts for the apostasy of so many in government from
the Madisonian Constitution and the American idea of governance?
No definitive answer is possible, of course, but perhaps some part of
the answer is this: The last thirty years or so has seen a change in the
dominant ideologies at the fermenting, radical, creative ends of the
spectrum of both national political parties. For a significant compo-
nent of the political intellectuals in (or influential in) both parties,
the process-oriented norms of democratic government are
illegitimate.
On the right, libertarians view government as an evil in itself,
ineradicably hostile to individual rights. The Christian fundamentalist
component of the right is also hostile to democratic outcomes that
contradict what they believe to be the commands of God-commands
that are not subject to debate or to being superseded by the popular
will.
63
On the left, the post-modernists profess to believe that all public
institutions are illegitimate because they serve only to promote the
interests of the powerful and keep the disenfranchised powerless.
Meanwhile, the left's allies among racial minorities and at least the
more radical components of the women's movement denounce the
government of the United States as historically and incurably racist
and sexist.
senses of the word. He appreciated the instrumental usefulness of the office's mythic aura,
and therefore, as a practiced thespian, donned its mantle in most public settings. But he
seems never to have understood that the moral stature and iconic power of the presidency
are a legacy arising in equal parts from the conduct of past holders of the office and the
aspirations of the people for the country the office serves. And he clearly never under-
stood that playing the public role of president imposed any constraints on his private be-
havior once he stepped away from the front of the footlights. Far from finding in the
public's gift of the presidency any obligation of rectitude or self-denial, he seemed to view
it mostly as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement, and, incredibly, as a really great way to meet
girls. Had the other actors in Clinton's impeachment drama been wiser and loved their
country better, they would have resisted the temptation to thrust the president's private
flaws into the nation's face. But it must not be forgotten that the principal author of the
Clinton impeachment was Bill Clinton.
The final irony of the Clinton impeachment saga is that Bill Clinton's monumental selfish-
ness and utter self-absorption, the very qualities that created the constitutional crisis, finally
produced the only observable benefit from the whole mess. In the firestorm following the
revelation of the Lewinsky adultery, virtually anyone else would certainly have resigned or
wilted under the pressure. Clinton's refusal to admit defeat dragged the country through
the sewer of his personal defects, but the experience was so profoundly demoralizing that
it killed the independent counsel statute, and may, at least for the immediately foreseeable
future, have discredited the politics of personal destruction.
63. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search
for the "Central Meaning" of the First Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1613, 1647-73 (2000) (re-
viewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAw, RELI-
GION, AND LOYALTY (1998)).
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The centrists of both parties are political pragmatists, people for
whom the highly specialized, expensive, denatured process of winning
elections is the exclusive and absorbing concern. In neither party is
there a strong voice for the proposition that the preservation of the
processes of democracy itself is more important than the resolution of
particular issues or cases. The result is a pervasive lack of respect,
even among the political classes, for the unique American constitu-
tional structure and for the institutions within that structure.
III. FALLING IN LOVE AGAIN
If the political classes in American life have indeed fallen out of
love with the American idea of politics and governance, what hope is
there for reconciliation and rekindling of the old flame? Love is a
complex phenomenon. Part of it is an unreasoning attachment to the
adored object. Love that progresses beyond infatuation, however, is a
more difficult balance. Though the romance persists, making love
work requires a hard-headed understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of love's object.
The unique character of the American idea gives rise to a para-
dox. The American Constitution is procedural in essence,' and
guarding it requires a persistent and thoughtful intellectual commit-
ment to keeping the elements of the constitutional structure in align-
ment. At the same time, central to the cohesion and vitality of any
nation is the romance of nationhood. Some part of that romance
rests on myths about the country's founding, its history, and the con-
nection between the nation's heroes and the fallible people who now
sit in the seats of power. A sophisticated appreciation of the task of
stewardship of the nation confers the insight that, sometimes at least,
protecting the people who fill the offices by averting our gaze from
their personal foibles serves to protect the offices themselves, and thus
to protect the process-based values of the Constitution.
All nations need myths. Some commentators have been rather
dismissive of the effects of the Clinton impeachment and the related
culture of attack politics in dissolving the myths surrounding the presi-
dency. Judge Posner, for example, seems to view diminution of the
grandeur as a healthy sign of political maturity.6 5 I disagree. Like all
myth, the myth of presidential exceptionalism serves important func-
64. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing how the Constitution is
outcome neutral).
65. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 262-66 (discussing the positive lessons to be learned
from the Clinton presidency).
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tions and operates at various levels. At the simplest level, the mythic
presidency appeals to the desire in all of us to be led by a larger-than-
life figure. But more important than the belief that the man who is
president is or should be special, is the understanding that the institu-
tion of the presidency is crucial to American government, and that
belittling the man diminishes the institution.
Thus, when the congressmen of Watergate worried aloud about
the damage that the scandal was doing to the presidency and the pre-
cedent that would be set by impeachment, they were not political naifs
bedazzled by historical myth. They, far more than the public, knew
Richard Nixon's ugly side (as well as his undoubted strengths). Many
of them had far greater reasons, both political and personal, to de-
spise Nixon the man and his policies. Amidst the undoubted calcula-
tions of partisan interests, these men and women were genuinely
worried that tearing down a president, even a bad president, would
weaken an entire branch of government, and thus the whole coun-
try.66 Concerns of that sort seemed notably absent from the Clinton
impeachment debate. The Republicans in both houses walked lock-
step through votes to impeach and convict with scarcely a restraining
note sounded by any of them.
The Clinton impeachment is also distinct from the Nixon case for
the remarkable failure of the proponents of impeachment to recog-
nize that bringing down a president for these reasons risked more
than demythologizing the single institution of the presidency. It
risked (and I think did) the far greater damage of tarnishing and be-
littling all three branches of government, and, indeed, the process of
governance generally.
The most common verdict on Watergate and President Nixon's
resignation was that "the Constitution worked." The principal lesson
that should be drawn from the Clinton impeachment is that ill-advised
changes to the constitutional structure combined with short-sighted
decisions by constitutional officers very nearly prevented the Constitu-
tion from working again. In my own view, farce though it ultimately
proved to be, the Clinton affair came nearer to being a long-term ca-
tastrophe for the conduct of American politics and government than
Watergate. If the Republican fire-breathers had prevailed, if the cul-
ture of criminalized attack politics had triumphed, American public
life would have been crippled for a generation and more. It was a
66. WHITE, supra note 1, at 408 (discussing the concern of one member of the House
Judiciary Committee, who, after voting to impeach President Nixon, worried that "[t]he
powers of all future Presidents might be reduced because Richard Nixon had abused
them").
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near-run thing. If such close calls are to be averted in the future,
judges, legislators, prosecutors, and presidents will need to think hard
about the adult lessons to be learned from William Jefferson Clinton's
juvenile affair. The preservation of the Madisonian structure of the
American Constitution and of the American idea of governance itself
depends on the presence in government of people who understand it,
believe in it, and act in each generation to preserve it.
The machine will not "go of itself."
